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• SUMMARY
The computer sizing technique has been applied to a number of military mission
profiles. Performance data can bedetermined for all segments of the selected
profile, which typicallyincludetakeoff, climb, cruise, loiter, reserveand landing
segments. Options are available for detailed calculationof combat performanceand
energy-maneuverabilitycharacteristics. Configurationchanges,such as externalfuel
tank drop and weapon expenditure,can be included in the mission. In the sizing
mode, aircraft gross weight, wing loading, and thrust-to-weightratio are varied
automaticallyto determinewhich combinationsmeet the design mission radius. The
resultingperformancedata can be used to create a "thumbprintplot." This plot is
•useful in determiningthe configurationsize that best satisfies the mission and
performancerequirements. The sizing mode can also be used to perform parametric
studiessuch as sensitivityof gross weightto alternatedesign conditions.
INTRODUCTION
In the preliminary design of a fighter aircraft, many possibilitiesmust be
examined in order to identify optimal configurations. Computersprovide a fast and
inexpensivemethod of performingthese tasks. Certainaspects of the design process,
such as performanceanalysis,can be assembled in a computer program. The computer
then can perform very rapid repetitivecalculations,varyingcertainparametersuntil
an optimumcombinationof these parametershas been identified.
Reference 1 describesthe developmentof a computertechniquefor determiningthe
mission radius and maneuverabilitycharacteristicsof fighter aircraft. This tech-
nique was applicableprimarilyto point designs. The computer program describedin
the reference1 has been modified to includea number of new capabilities. One of
these is an automatedpreliminarysizing option. In this mode, startingwith a well
definedbaseline configuration,the programwill automaticallydeterminethe combina-
tions of aircraftgross weight, wing loading (W/S), and thrust-to-weightratio (T/W)
that meet a required mission radius, For each of these combinations,additional
performance items, such as takeoff and landing field length and maneuverability
characteristicsare determined. This data is used to createa •"thumbprint"plot.
This plot is used, in turn, to determinethe configurationsize in terms of Takeoff
Gross Weight (TOGW), W/S, and T/W that best meets all the mission performance
constraints. This method permits rapid identificationof an optimum configuration
size.
- The purpose of this paper is to describe the performance program and the
developmentof the new sizing capability. Included are descriptionsof the military
mission profiles the program can represent and the methods used to calculate the
performancedata. The use of the sizingtechniqueto define an optimumconfiguration
size and the determinationof additionalperformancedata for the sized configuration
is also described. The discussion is illustratedthrough examples taken from a
conceptualdesign study performedat the NASA LangleyResearchCenter.
DISGUSSION
HistoricalBackground
U.S.A.F. Fighters.-A chronologicaldepictionof Air Force fightertypes (fiG. 2)
begins with the first U.S. jet fighter, the Bell XP-59A Airacomet, in the early
1940's. The "P" designationfor "pursuit"was in use through the era of the United
States Army Air Force (USAAF). When the United States Air Force (USAF)was created
in 1947, the pursuit designationwas changed to "F" for "fighter." Hence, for a
period of time, some service aircraft carried both designations,such as the P-86
(F-86)and P-84 (F-84). Shown in figure 2 are the Air Force fightersthat have been
built and flown overthe past 40 years, althoughnot all reachedoperationalstatus.
All were jet-propelledwith the exceptionof the propeller-drivenP-82 twin Mustang
and the P-81 with a combinationof turbopropand turbojet propulsion. The advent of
jet propulsion produced quite a flurry of fighter prototypes from the mid-1949's
through the mid-1950's. Beginningin the late 1950's,however, USAF fighter proto-
types have been relativelyfew and far between.
U.S.N. Fighters.- A similar depictionof Navy fighters (fig. 3) shows the same
rapid developmentof prototypes in the mid-1940 to mid-1950 time period. Following
the F4H in 1958, however,new Navy fightershave been extremelyrare.
Composite U.S. Military Aircraft Trend.- A composite view of all U.S. military
aircraft types since 1942 is shown in figure 4 together with some developmenthigh-
lights. The P-59, of course, representedthe beginningof U.S. jet propulsion. The
use of wing sweep was a highlight of the P-86. The F-92 introducedthe use of the
tailless delta conceptthat was extendedto supersonicspeed with the F-102 and F-106
interceptorsand the B-58 bomber. The F-IO0 introducedthe supersonic swept-wing
concept. Other supersonicswept-wing concepts with the added use of the area rule
for dra_ reductionwere the F-105 and F-11F. The F-104 introducedthe use of a thin,
low-aspect-ratio,trapezoidalwing. The F4H introduceda slightly compromisedwing
planform having a relatively large leading-edgesweep angle but with a large root
chord that resulted in a low trailing-edge sweep angle. The F4H design also
incorporated twin jet engines--a departure from many preceding classic fighter
designs. Some other twin jet designshad previouslybeen developed,however, includ-
ing the first jet (P-59),the XF-83, the XF-88,the F-89, the XF-90,the F-101, the
F-5, the F3D, of which the principleoperationaltypes were the subsonic F-89 and the
supersonicF-10i.
Mach number 3 flight was achieved in the mid-1960'swith the SR-71 (YF-12)air-
craft and with the XB-70 bomber. The XB-70 also representeda differentU.S. design
type with itsaft delta wing and canard controlsurface.
In the mid-1960's,the operational use of variable wing sweep appeared on the
F-111 design. Previousdevelopmentof variablewing sweep had been done with the X-5
and the XFIOF. Variablewing-sweepconceptsto follow later in the 1960'sand early
197_'s were the F-14 and the B-I. Other than the Air Force F-111 and the Navy F-14, .
no other U.S. fighter-typeaircraft that employs variable sweep has been produced.
Subsequentfighter designs such as the F-15, F-16, and F-18 employ fixed wings with
essentially trapezoidal planforms and aft tails. The X-29 experimental aircraft
currently being developed employs a fixed forward-sweptwing and a canard control
surface.
The many concepts developedduring the period from about 1942 to the mid-1960's
relied heavily on experimentaldata--bothwind tunnel and flight. Beginning in the
mid-1960's,computer-aideddesigntechniqueswere developedthat could greatlyreduce
the design time and permit rapid turnaroundtime in examiningdesign changes and in
making trade studies. Althoughthese techniquesare availablefor increaseddesign
capabilityand have been used in numerousdesign studies,the capabilityhas not been
reflectedin many new flight articlesover the past 20 years.
U.S. and U.S.S.R. MilitaryAircraft Trends.-The U.S. military aircrafttrend is
repeated in figure 5 and the U.S.S.R. military aircrafttrend has been added. The
U.S.S.R.trend does not show the early rapid growth of types followed by a tapering-
off as occurred in the U.S. Rather,the U.S.S.R.trend has been steady and persis-
tent with an influx of new types appearing at fairly regular intervalsup to the
presenttime. It should be pointedout that the U.S.S.R.trend does not reflectthe
extensive modificationsthat are made to some designs. For example, the MiG-21
Fishbedand the MiG 23 Floggerare each shown as single points,whereas, in reality,
modificationsto such designshave resultedin a larger family of sometimesdramati-
cally differentaircrafttypes.
Some other observationsrelativeto the U.S.S.R.trend are:
o Exploitation of jet propulsion (such as MiG-9) followed closely to U.S.
developments.
o Swept-wing jet, MiG-15, in same time period as P-86, subsequentlyimproved
with MiG-17.
o First supersonicjet, MiG-19,in same time frame as F-IO0.
o M = 3 flight,E-166 and E-266, achievedin same time frame as SR-71.
o Configurationtypes have included early straight wings; swept wings; delta
wings with aft tails; trapezoidalwings; variable-sweepwings.
o Variablesweep development(FitterB, Flogger)in sametimeframeas F-111.
o Extensive use of variable sweep, being used on the Fitter B and Flogger
fighter families, the Fencer fighter-bomber,and the Backfire and Blackjack
bombers.
o Exploitation of V/STOL with direct-lift engines and vectored nozzles and
deploymentof Forger VTOL in same timeframeas AV-8.
PerformanceCharacteristics
Thrust-to-Weightand Speed Trends.- The maximum thrust-weight ratios and the
. approximatemaximum Mach number for several U.S. and U.S.S.R. fighter aircraft are
shown in figure 6. It would be unwiseto expect a compilationof data of this type
to lead to definative conclusions since the considerationof many other factors
precludesany necessarilydirect correlationbetweenT/W and M. However,in general,
it would be expectedthat an increase in T/W would provide for increasedspeed, or
conversely,that an increasein M would requiresome increasein T/W. Such a general
trend is displayed for the various fighters shown. There is no question that some
aircraft have been underpoweredand thus restrictedin speed. Others may be over-
poweredfor the maximum speed with the excesspower being dictatedby such considera-
tions as improvedtake-off performance,improvedaccelerationor climb rate, improved
maneuverability,and so on. However, there is still the possibilitythat some
relationexists between the speed and power factors and the aerodynamicdrag of the
airframe. In addition,the type of inlet becomesa factor--normalshock inlets,for
example,may impose speed limitationssoonerthan a variablegeometry inlet.
The U.S. fighters follow a fairly linear trend from the early subsonic jets
through the more recent supersonicjets. Major departuresare the AV-8, which falls
above the general trend, with the higher T/W being used for the V/STOL capability,
and the F-111 and F-14 aircraft,which fall below the trend, with the higher speeds
presumablyresultingfrom lower drag due to the high wing sweep and the larger size
airframewhich should permit a more favorablearea distribution.
The F-15 has an indicated speed capabilitythat is about the same as the F-111
and F-14 althoughthe maximumT/W isabout twice as large. This may be due, in part,
to excessiveT/W in the F-15 for other purposesand, in part, to lower drag for the
F-111 and F-14 due to wing sweep and better area distribution.
A tentativeassessmentof the U.S.S.R.aircraft indicatesa generaltrend of T/W
versus M that is slightlybetter than the U.S. trend. That is to say that generally
higher speeds are indicatedat lower levels of T/W. For example,the MiG-21,MiG-23,
MiG-25, MiG-31, SU-15, SU-27, and MiG-29 family all indicate speeds equal to, or
greater than the F-18, F-16, and F-15 family with the same, or less, T/W values.
This difference reflects the probability of lower drag due to more slender area
distributionsand, in the case of the MiG-23,some added benefitsof wing sweep. The
Yak-36 operateswith a lower T/W than the AV-8 presumablybecauseof the utilization
of direct lift engines to aid the V/STOL capability. The TU-28 which operates at
about the same speed as the F-16 and F-18 but with half the T/W, is an extremely
large, long-rangeinterceptor,which should have a better area distributionthan the
small fighters, llleSU-24 which, in many ways, is physicallysimilar to the F-111
and F-14 has T/W and M characteristicsthat are also similar.
It cannot be overemphasizedthat conclusionsdrawn from this type of comparison
must be kept in context with other considerationsthat enter into speed and thrust
values. Some of these additionalconsiderationswill be discussedsubsequently.
PerformanceCapability.-Another measure of performancecan be presented in the
form of maximum takeoff thrust-weight ratio and combat wing loading (about half
fuel). This kind of measure (fig. 7) indicatesthat, in general, as T/W increases
and W/S decreases,a tendencytoward increasedagilityshould result--morepower with
which to move and less weight to be moved. As the wing loadingincreases,a tendency
toward increased endurance generally occurs since the increased weight usually
resultsfrom an increase in fuel. A large number of U.S. aircraftand U.S.S.R. air-
craft can be placed within bounds that largely overlap. If anything,the U.S.S.R.
boundary indicates a slightly greater tendency toward agility whereas the U.S.
boundary shows a slight tendency toward increased endurance. Falling outside the
region of reasonably similar boundarieswere the U.S. F-15, F-16, F-18. These air-
craft indicate increased agility due to high-thrust loadingswhile maintaininglow
wing loading. Although parameters for the U.S.S.R. MiG-29 and SU-27 are not
sufficientlydefined, it is reasonableto speculatethat they would be well outside
the U.S.S.R. boundary shown and would probably be in the direction of increased
agility similarto the F-16 and F-18. The U.S. F-111 and the U.S.S.R.SU-24 are well
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outside the boundariesin the generaldirection of greater endurance. The U.S.S.R.
TU-26 bomber is also shown as an example of an aircraft that would be expected to
maximize on endurancewith less concernfor agility.
Agility Potential.-Using data such as that on figure 7, another way of lookingo
at the implicationsis simplyto dividethe maximumthrust-weightratio by the combat
wing loading for specific aircraft and arrive at a factor defined as the agility
; potential. The higher the ratio of T/W to W/S, the greater the potential for
agility. This kind of measure is shown in figure 8 for a number of aircraftover the
years from the mid-1940's. Again it is recognizedthat a number of other factors
enter into agility, but taken in contextthis kind of measurecan providesome useful
insights.
It is apparent that over the years a number of U.S. fighters having various
measures of thrust, weight, and size, resulted in agility potentials not vastly
different. Notable exceptions are the F-102 and F-106 in the late lg50's that,
primarily because of low values of W/S (large wing area), displayed substantial
higher values of agility potentialthan what might be considereda nominal average.
In fact, by this form of measurement,the F-102 agilitywas not exceeded until the
F-15 was producedsome 20 years later and subsequentlywas about equaledby the F-16.
In the same timeframe as the F-102 and F-106, the F-104 is an interestingexample.
Originally intendedas an air superiorityfighter, based on the experienceof Korea,
the F-104 was expected to reach combat altitude quickly and to be able to fight at
high altitudes. Accordingly,the airplane had a high T/W for its time but also a
high W/S (smallwing area) and the result was again only an averagevalue of agility
potential. A comment made by Kelly Johnson in 1954 concerning the F-104 is of
interest--withairplanes such as the F-I01, F-I02, F-105, and F-I06 in mind he said
".... what we have done is bring an end to the trend toward constantlybigger,
constantlymore comPlicated,constantlymore expensiveairplanes."
The F-5 airplanes,while moderate in size ahd cost, indicatean agilitypotential
about the same as that for the F-104 or the F-86. The mainstay for many years, the
F-4 is about the nominalaveragein agility. The F-16 and F-15 representsubstantial
improvementsin this measure over the F-4. The U.S.S.R. MiG-21, Mig-23, and SU-15
are about equal to, or slightlybetterthan, the F-4 but substantiallybelow the F-15
and F-16. Again, it might be expectedthat the MiG-29 and SU-27 will be about the
same as the F-16--animprovementover previousU.S.S.R.fighters.
Sea Level Climb Rate.- Another performance gauge is the rate of climb at sea
level, which is shown for various aircraft in Figure 9 as a function of Mach
number. These data, within the accuracythat is available,show a reasonablylinear
progression of increasing sea-level climb rate with increasing maximum speed
capahility. In general, U.S. fighters appear to be somewhat better performers in
this measure than U.S.S.R. fighters. In early jet fighters, some advantage was
evident for the MiG-17 compared to the F-86A and for the MiG-19 compared to the
F-IO0. The F-86D, however, performedbetter than the MiG-17. Some other observa-
tions are:w
o The F-106 indicatesa marked improvementover the F-102.
o The F-I04, with advantages of lightweightand attendantpossible lower cost,
exhibits a Climb rate that is about the same as the F-101 and F-106.
o The F-4D representedan improvementover previous U.S. tactical fighters and
most U.S.S.R.fighters--exceptionsbeing the MiG-23 and MiG-21N.
o The MiG-21N,with increasedthrust,has a substantiallyhigher climb rate than
the MiG-21Fand, in fact, is about comparableto the F-16.
o The F-16 and F-15, both with high T/W, indicatethe highestclimb rates.
Insufficientdata precludesthe inclusionof the MiG-29 and SU-27 but it might be -
expectedthat these aircraftwould be comparableto the F-16 and, perhaps,the F-15.
Maneuverin9 Parameter.-A maneuveringparameterhas been developedin the Langley
DifferentialManeuveringSimulator. This parameterincludes,not only T/W and W/S,
but also takes into accountthe lift-dragratio and the maximum attainablelift. The
maneuvering parameter correspondsdirectly to the time-on-advantagefor one-on-one
fighter combat. The maneuveringparameteris directlyproportionalto thrust-weight,
lift-drag, and maximum lift, and is inverselyproportionalto wing loading. The
parameter is shown in bar-graphform in figure 10 for various U.S. fighters. The
F-104 and F-4C appear at the lower end of the spectrumpartly because of high wing
loadings. The F-4E is measurably better than the F-4C because of better lift
characteristics. The F-15 and F-16 indicatedramatic maneuver performanceimprove-
ments because of the high thrust-to-weightand the low wing loading. Insufficient
data again precludesU.S.S.R.fightersbut intuitivelyit might be expectedthat some
versions of the MiG-21 and MiG-23 would have respectfullyhigh maneuver parameters,
and that the MiG-29 and SU-27 may be in a class with the F-15 and F-16.
Turn Rate.- Turn rates, instantaneousand sustained, are shown for several
fighters at M = 0.9 and an altitude of 15,000feet in figure 11. The F-16 and F-15
represent improvements over the predecessor F-4E, particularly in sustained turn
rate, and also indicate better turn characteristicsthan two operational U.S.S.R.
fighters--the MiG-21 and MiG-23. However, some reported values for the newer
U.S.S.R. MiG-29 and SU-27 turn-rate performanceare considerablybetter than pre-
ceding U.S.S.R.fightersand superiorto the U.S. F-16 and the F-15.
The F-5E is included to indicate the comparabilitywith the MiG-21 and MiG-23.
This is one of the reasonsthat the F-5 has been utilizedby aggressorsquadrons.
Some Other MissionConsiderations
Again, it would be presumptuousto think that all factorsthat enter into mission
capability could be addressed in this paper. However, a few observationswill be
offeredfor considerationon some mission characteristics.
Supersonic Flyout. Some resultsbased on a type of analysisthat has been done
by Riccioni (fig. 12)show the mission radiusas a functionof average outboundspeed
(from 0 to Mmax) for severalU.S. fightersperforminga supersonicflyout from take-
off with an optimum cruise back. Internalfuel only is used except where noted.
Obviously, other values of radius would result for other conditions, particularly
where subsonic segments are includedin the flyout. The purpose of these data, how-
ever, is to attempta comparisonof supersonicefficiencyby indicatingabout how far
out you might fly (radius)as a function of the time (speed)utilized in reaching
that distance. The desired results would be those in the upward and outward
directions,of course. There is a generaltendency toward reducedefficiency (less
radius)with increasingaverageoutboardspeed as the fighter-typesprogressfrom the
F-IOOD,to the F-5E, the F-104, the F-4E, and the F-15A. Exceptionsare the F-104
with tip tanks (additionalfuel) which goes considerablyfartherthan the basic F-104
but at a lower average speed; the F-106, which has the greatest radius on internal
fuel only and flys out at the same average speed as the F-4E, thus reflecting a
cleaner design;and the F-16A,which reflectsbetter efficiencyin thatthe radius is
about equal to, or greaterthan, the F-5E, F-104, and F-4E, but at a higher average
speed. The F-15A indicatesa decrease in efficiencysince the radius drops rapidly
__ with increasedaverage speed.
One familiar message from this type of comparison is that the efficiency of
supersonic-capablefighters needs to be improved. Or, put more simply, if a super-
sonic flyout radius greater than 100 nautical miles is required,then the maximum
average outbound speed capabilityof the F-15A cannot be utilized. In comparison,an
F-106 using an averageM of 1.5 would fly out 150 nauticalmiles. The main consider-
ations here are simply: "How far do you need to go?" and "Howquicklydo you need to
get there?"
Supersonic Air-to-Air Potential. Another mission consideration is shown in
figure 13 for the same fighters illustratedin figure 12. This considerationhas to
do with the air-to,air potentialcapability--orwhat you potentially can do after
reachingthe supersoniccombat radius. The supersonicflyout radius is shown in bar-
graph form and the air-to-air ordnance carried is tabulated for each airplane.
Observationsthat can be made from this figure are:
o The F-IO0 at about 150 nauticalmiles would operatewith guns only.
o The F-104 with a range from 140 to 180 nautical miles could use a gun and
could fire two missiles.
o The F-106, also at a range of about 150 nautical miles, could fire five
missiles,one of which was a Genie, and carriedno gun.
o The F-4 at a lesser range of about 120 nauticalmiles could fire four missiles
and also use a gun.
o Both the F-5 and the F-16, with nearly comparableranges of about 130 nautical
miles could fire only two missilesand use a gun.
o The F-15, with the shortest range of about 100 nautical miles, could fire
eight missilesand also use a gun.
This kind of informationposes some questions,such as: "is a shorter radiusof
action with more firing opportunitiesa fair trade for a larger radius of action with
less firing opportunities?" The extremes, of course, are to have tremendous fire-
power capability but not to be able to take it anyplace, or to have a tremendous
range capability but no firepower. The answer lies somewhere between and must be
given seriousconsiderationwith the ultimate goal of having tremendousfirepowerat
a tremendousradius.
Internal Fuel and Maximum Ordnance Trends.- The data presented in figure 14 is
intended to suggest another consideration in the assessment of fighter mission
capabilitytrends. These data show the internal fuel capacity and the maximum
ordnance load (includingair-to-ground)for various fighter aircraft over the past
40 years. These data interrelatethe vehicle size and volume with the potential
lethality. Early jet fighters were quite small and hence had relatively small
quantities of internal fuel and relativelylow maximum ordnance load capability. A
generaltrend toward increasedsize over the years has resultedin increasedinternal
fuel capacityand increasedload-carryingcapability.
Some observationsare:
o Some supersonicdesigns remainedsmall, such as the F-104 and F-5, with little
growth in internalfuel capacity,but with some increase in ordnance load for
the F-5E.
o The F-101 and F-106 were large airplaneswith large internal fuelcapacity.
The ordnance load was low, however, since the primary weapon was air-to-air
missiles.
o The F-105, althoughhaving little growth in internalfuel capacitycomparedto
preceding aircraft, did show considerable growth in maximum ordnance load
becauseof the number of air-to-groundweapons carriedexternally.
o The F-4 provided further growth in load carrying capability through the
additionof externallycarriedair-to-groundweapons.
o The F-111 is a large airplane with an exceptionally large internal fuel
capacity and a large ordnancecarryingcapability. The internalfuel capacity
of the F-111A is a little over 5000 gallons comparedto about 400 gallonsfor
an F-80 or F-86 and about 1800 gallonsfor an F-15.
o The F-14 has a large internal fuel capacity (about 2500 gallons)and a large
ordnance load comprisedmainly of large air-to-airmissiles.
o The F-15, F-16, and F-1R are all good load carrierswith a mix of air-to-air
and air-to-groundweapons. The F-18 appearsto be an exceptionallygood load
carrierfor its size.
SomeWeight Factors
Combat Weight.- The trend in combat weight as a function of Mach number is shown
in figure 15 for several U.S. fighters. For these data, the airplanes are configured
for air-to-air missions and the combat weight is composed of the empty weight, half
fuel, full gun ammunition, and air-to-air missiles. The general trend is an increase
in combat weight as the maximum Mach number increases. There is a lower bound of
what might be considered lightweight fighters including the F-5, F-I04, and F-16.
For some aircraft, such as the F-Ill, F-18, and A-7, the combat weight is
dictated more by the large fuel capacity rather than by munition weight. For the
F-14, both a larger fuel capacity and a large munition load are contributing
factors. At the highest Mach number, the large difference in combat weight for the
F-15 and F-Ill reflects a design emphasis for air superiority with the F-15 and a
design emphasis for multipurpose ground attack and long range with the F-Ill. Hence
any attempt to compare fighter capability in terms of combat weight should be done
with great care because of the many factors included.
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Operating Weight Empty.- The trend in operatingempty weight with Mach number is
shown in figure 16 for U.S. and some U.S.S.R. fighters. The empty weight includes
all fixed equipmentbut no fuel or munitions. The trend is again toward an increase
in weight with increasing Mach nUmber. These data also reflect the influence of
aircraft size with the smalleraircrafton the lower bound and the larger aircrafton
the upper bound. In general,the U.S.S.R.fightersappearto be slightly betterthan
the U.S. fighters in terms of empty weightand speed. Exceptionsare the TU-28, an
exceedinglylarge interceptorfor which there is no U.S. counterpart,and perhapsthe
. Yak-36with its direct-liftengines.
To some extent,the empty weight provides a measureof cost--thelarger,heavier
aircraft being more expensivethan the smaller,lighteraircraft. The cost, however,
must also be tempered by other factors such as the complexity.
Fighter Weight Distribution.-The distributionof the empty Weight for various
basic U.S. fighters over the past 40 years (fig. 17) providesan interestingpattern.
The percentof empty weight allottedto structure,propulsion,auxiliaries,avionics,
and fixed weapon equipment is shown for each airplane. The followingobservations
are made:
o With little exception,the percent of empty weight allottedto each category
has remainedabout constantsince the days of the F-80.
o The largest single part of the empty weight is the structure. Thus, the
possibilityfor meaningful reductions in empty weight lies in the areas of
manufacturingand structuraltechniquesand in the area of materials.
o Reductions in the weight of propulsion systems and various auxiliary
•mechanismsoffer the possibilityof large payoffs in weight reduction.
o The percentof weight allottedto avionicshas remainedrelativelysmall.
o The percent of Weight allotted to the fixed equipment necessary for weapons
carriage is almost insignificant.
A general observation regardingthe distributionof fighter weight is that a
large amount of equipment (almost90% in structures,propulsion,and auxiliaries)is
required in order to provide support for the primary purpose of the fighter--the
carriage and delivery of weapons. Hence, very careful attentionshould be given to
improvingthe cost effectivenessof fighters by reducingthe complexityand the cost
of systemsused simplyto get the weaponsairborne.
DCPR Weight.- The Defense Contractor Planning Report (DCPR)weight is, perhaps,
more nearly related to the structural cost. This weight is comprised of the
structural airframe includingthe necessaryfixed wiring, tubing, and controls but
" does not includethe engine, wheels, or instrumentation. The trend in DCPR weight
for fighters over the last 40 years (fig. 18) again shows a progressiveincrease in
airframe weight for most fighters primarilydue to size. Those airplanesthat have
remained relatively small (F-104, F-5, F-16) show little change in airframe weight
over the years. The F-111 weight, which seems to be exceptionallyhigh, is partly
due to weight associatedwith the variablewing-sweepstructure. It is reasonableto
assume that the manufacturingcost will increasewith increasingDCPR weight. Hence,
a clear message to detect--althoughchallengingto implement--isto reduce the size
and weight of fighters while retaining, or improving,the mission capability. The
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challenges are in such areas as manufacturingtechnology,materialstechnology,and
improvedaerodynamicsto reduce volumeand thrust requirements.
Some Cost Factors
Quantityand Cost Trends.-The trends in U.S. fighter/attackaircraftprocurement
and flyawaycost from 1968 to 1982 (fig. 19) shows a decrease in quantity and cost
immediatelyfollowingVietnam,but, since the early 1970's,the quantityof fighter/
attack aircraft accepted has been more or less constantwhile the flyaway cost has
risen significantly. This is a pictureof a fundamentalproblemtoday--canwe afford
what we believeto be needed, or can we expect to maintain an adequate defensewith
what we believewe can afford? Indeed,this is an easy problemto state,but a quite
difficultone to answer.
Flyaway Unit Costs.- The flyaway unit cost for several fighter/attackaircraft
procured in 1981 is shown in figure 20. As might have been expectedfrom some of the
previous discussionon aircraftsize and capability,the F-14 and F-15 are relatively
expensive, and the F-18 is, as yet, quite expensive. Other factors, such as
complexity,also must be considered. Questionsthat may be asked--"Areyou getting
what you are paying for?" or "Do you need what you are getting?"are easily asked
but, again, difficultto answer.
Lot Average Cost.- The lot averagecost of severalairplanesin 1981 dollarsover
the years from about 1950 is shown in figure 21. These average costs reflect the
total number of aircraft procured and the number of years during which they were
procured. Although the numbers change slightly when averaged in this manner, the
generaltrend in cost increaseis unchanged.
Lot Average Cost Distribution.-The distributionof lot average cost for several
current fighters is shown in bar-graphform in figure 22. Althoughthe amountsvary
considerably,some generalobservationscan be made:
o The largest amount is applied to the airframe as might be expected from
previousdiscussionof the weight distribution.
o Propulsionis the second largestexpense.
o The airframecost appearsto be, by far, the largestcost item for the F-18--
exceedingthe total cost of the F-15, for example.
o The avionics cost for the F-18 seems surprisinglylow compared to the total
F-18 cost, as well as in comparisonto the avionics cost for the other air-
planes.
Flyaway Cost Distribution.-The distributionof flyaway cost for various basic
U.S. fighters over the past 40 years is presentedin figure 23. Again,the airframe
is shown to be the largest cost factor, averagingabout 60 percentof the total fly-
away cost over the years. The second largest cost contributor is generally the
propulsionsystem. The beginningof the era of avionics in the 1960's is evident by
the increase in percentcost devotedto avionics--becomingabout the same as that for
propulsion. The same results are shown in bar-graphform in figure 24 for the more
recentfighters (past 20 years). The cost fractionfor each item shown is dependent
lO
L •
upon a number of factors such as the number of units built, the complexityof the
item, variationsin manufacturingtechniques,and so on.
CONCLUDINGREMARKS
It has been the purposeof this paper to reviewsome fighteraircrafttrends over
the past four decades in order to illuminatesome of the factorsto be consideredin
. assessingthe relativemerit of fighter aircraft. Where possible,comparisonswere
made between U.S. aircraft and U.S.S.R. aircraft. While it is not presumed that
specific conclusionscould be drawn from this trend study, some pertinent observa-
tions are made.
o The assessmentof fighter capability is dependeDton many factorsand extreme
caution should be used to assure that conclusionsare not based on the use of
any preconceivedobvious indicatorsto the exclusionof some less obvious and
possiblyconflictingindicators.
o Some fighter aircrafttend to excel in air-to-aircapabilityand some in air-
to-ground capability--thetrue multipurpose fighter still appears to be
elusive.
o For the most part, U.S.S.R. fighter trends have been quite similar to U.S.
fightertrends.
o The latest U.S. operational fighters are apparently superior to U.S.S.R.
fighters, however, this may be offset by U.S.S.R. fighters currently being
readiedfor deployment.
o The empty weight distribution of U.S. fighters has remained relatively
constant over the past 40 years, with the largest contributingfactor being
the structure.
o Generally speaking, about 90 percent of the empty weight (structures,
propulsion,auxiliaries)is required to supportthe mission of weapon carriage
and delivery.
o Since the early 1970's,the quantity of fighter/attackaircraft accepted has
been essentiallyconstant,whereasthe total flyaway cost has tended to rise.
o The largestcost item is that due to the airframestructure.
o The challenge to fighter technology is to reduce the size and weight of
fighters while retaining, or improving, the mission capability--these
challenges being in such areas as manufacturing, structural design and
materialstechnology, and in improvedaerodynamicsthat reduce the volume and
thrust requirements.
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Figure 2.- Chronology of U.S. Air Force fighters.
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Figure 3.- Chronology of U.S. Navy fighters.
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Figure 4.- Chronologyof U.S. military aircraftdevelopments.
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Figure 5.- Chronology of U.S. and U.S.S.R.military aircrafttrends.
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Figure 6.- Thrust-to-weight and maximum Mach number trends,
U.S. and U.S.S.R. aircraft.
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Figure. 7.- Thrust-to-weight versus combat wing loading for
U.S. and U.S.S.R.aircraft.
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Figure 8.- Agilitypotentialfor IJ.S.and U.S.S.R.aircraft.
Figure 9.- Sea-level rate of climb versus Mach numberfor
tI.S. and U.S.S.R. aircraft.
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Figure 11,- Turn rate for U.S. and U.S.S.R.aircraft,
M = 0.9 at 15,000feet.
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Figure 12.- Supersonic flyout mission.
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Figure 13.- Air-to-air combat potential for supersonic flyout mission.
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Figure 14.- Internal fuel and maximumordnance trends.
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Figure 15.- Combatweight versus Mach number.
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Figure 16.- Empty weighttrends versus _lachnumber for
tl.S.and tI.S.S.R,aircraft.
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Figure 17.- Distribution of empty weight for various U.S. fighters
over the past 40 years.
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Figure 18.- The DCPR weight trends for U.S. fighters.
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Figure 19.- Trend in quantity procuredand total flyawaycost for
U.S. fighter/attackaircraft,1968 to 1982.
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Figure 20.- Flyaway unit cost, U.S. fighter/attack aircraft, 1981.
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Figure 22.- Distribution of lot average cost for. current fighters,1981 dollars.
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Figure 23.- Distributionof flyaway cost for variousU.S. fighters
over past 40 years.
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Figure 24.- Percentage distribution of flyaway cost.
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